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TRANSFORMATION AND PERSONAL
IDENTITY IN KANT
Jacqueline Marina

This paper explores how Kant's development of the idea of the disposition in
the Religion copes with problems implied by Kant's idea of transcendental
freedom. Since transcendental freedom implies the power of absolutely beginning a state, and therefore of absolutely beginning a series of the consequences
of that state, a transcendentally free act is divorced from the preceding state of
an agent, and would thus seem to be divorced from the agent's character as
well. The paper is divided into two parts. First I analyze Kant's understanding of the disposition and discuss the ways in which it allows us to understand a person's transcendentally free actions in terms of that person's character. I then discuss Kant's resources for understanding the Socratic injunction
to care for the soul in light of his concept of the disposition.

Kant's account of transcendental freedom, particularly as developed in the
Groundwork and in the first and second Critiques, seems to imply a radical
discontinuity between an agent who acts at time b and that same who acts
at time b. Transcendental freedom, it will be remembered, is the "power of
absolutely beginning a state, and therefore also of absolutely beginning a
series of consequences of that state."1 Insofar as an action is transcendentally free, it is an absolute beginning and is as such in no wise grounded in
the prior state of the agent. This means that the two states, that of an agent
before the initiation of action and that of the agent initiating the action, cannot be connected in a law-like manner. The positing of transcendental freedom would thereby seem to vitiate the unity of experience. These consequences are further reaching still when applied to the practical sphere: if
we assume transcendental freedom it seems that we are not able to connect
an action with an agent's character, that is, we are not able to understand
how an action flows from the character of the agent, since assuming transcendental freedom, there is no way of connecting the action with the state
of the agent preceding the action.
These issues have far-reaching consequences for how we are to understand moral development and character formation. If we are to envision
ourselves as completely free at the moment of moral choice, the question of
the cultivation of the soul can easily become one that is indifferent to us.
F. D. Schleiermacher, for instance, charged that the idea of transcendental
freedom is a dangerous one; it lulls people into unconcern regarding the
formation of character and the care of the soul. It deludes them into thinkFAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
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ing that at a moment's notice they can reverse the effects of a life ill-lived
and all of a sudden start doing the right thing. As such, the whole train of
states of the soul which must precede an individual's ability to act virtuously, in particular in situations requiring a great deal of moral fortitude,
would simply be ignored. The idea that at the moment of moral choice we
are no more determined to choose one way than to choose another seems
to imply that our past actions do not affect our present ones. 2
This paper will explore how Kant's development of the idea of the disposition as developed in the Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone
copes with some of these difficulties. I will argue that through it Kant is
able to take into account the significance of character formation and the
importance of instilling virtue while at the same time preserving transcendental freedom. Good and bad deeds do not occur in a vacuum; underlying them is the disposition, the ground of good and bad maxims. As the
underlying maxim grounding all other maxims, the disposition serves as a
principle unifying all actions of the self flowing from rule governed behavior. As such, the disposition is the seat of a person's character. While it
connects an individual's various maxims made over time with one another
by grounding them in an underlying maxim, it still preserves transcendental freedom since the disposition is itself freely chosen.
The paper is divided into two parts. In the first part I analyze Kant's
understanding of the disposition and discuss the ways in which it allows us
to understand a person's transcendentally free actions in terms of that person's character. In order to analyze the deep structure of what a disposition
is and what it entails for Kant's understanding of character, I compare
Kant's view of personal identity with Parfit's Humean understanding of it.
In the second part of the paper I discuss Kant's resources for understanding the Socratic injunction to care for the soul in light of his concept of
the disposition. Kant's critics have accused him of an inability to give a
coherent account of how the phenomenal development of virtue is possible
given his account of transcendental freedom. How is it possible to care for
the soul if, in accordance with the doctrine of transcendental freedom, our
present state does not determine our future actions? Concern with one's
character makes sense only if past states can influence future ones and the
actions that flow from them.

T. Personal Identity and the Disposition
Kant introduces the concept of the disposition or Gesinnung in the context of his discussion of radical evil in the Religion. The disposition is the
ground of all an individual's maxim making, although it is itself freely
acquired. As such, the disposition serves as a bridge linking the maxims
an individual adopts at time b with the maxims adopted at time b:
To have a good or an evil disposition as an inborn natural constitution does not here mean that it has not been acquired by the man
who harbors it, that he is not author of it, but rather, that it has not
been acquired in time (that he has always been good, or evil, from his
youth up). The disposition, i.e., the ultimate subjective ground of the
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adoption of maxims, can be one only and applies universally to the
whole use of freedom. Yet this disposition itself must have been
adopted by free choice, for otherwise it could not be imputed. But
the subjective ground or cause of this adoption cannot further be
known (though it is inevit'able that we should inquire into it), since
otherwise still another maxim would have to be adduced in which
this disposition must have been incorporated, a maxim which itself in
turn must have its ground. Since, therefore, we are unable to derive
this disposition, or rather its ultimate ground, from any original act of
the will in time, we call it a property of the will which belongs to it by
nature (although actually the disposition is grounded in freedom).'
Insofar as the disposition is the ultimate subjective ground of maxim-making, it functions much in the same way as a person's character. Through it
we can understand continuities in a person's decisions and actions. When
Kant says that the disposition is a "property of the will which belongs to it
by nature" he means that the disposition is that which accounts for all the
maxims that an agent makes in time. However, it is important to understand the relationship between the disposition and these lower-level maxims. A person's disposition does not function as a pre-existing condition
that determines an agent to adopt a maxim-much in the same way that a
complex of efficient causes would be sufficient to produce a given effect. It
functions, rather, as the reason or principle that accounts for why a given
maxim was chosen. This reason or principle in accordance with which we
choose lower level maxims is itself freely chosen and is hence something
acquired; it is something for which we are responsible.
The disposition is an agent's "highest" maxim; as such, it cannot be
accounted for by invoking some higher-level maxim. For instance, if an
individual makes it her maxim to lie when she finds herself in difficulty,
we can always inquire into the ground of this maxim, that is, the reason for
her adoption of it. Precisely insofar as we think of this maxim as having
been freely adopted, and thus not adopted as the result of some natural
impulse, the only explanation that can be given for the adoption of this
maxim m1 is another maxim m2' by virtue of which we can understand
how it was that m1 could have posed as an incentive to the will. In other
words, once we posit freedom, the only reason that can be given for a person's having chosen to act on the maxim to lie when in difficulty is another
maxim, one which accounts for the fact that this maxim was deemed worth
acting on. But if we inquire into the ground of our adoption of m2, the
answer can only lie in another maxim, m3. If we continue in our inquiry
into the ground for the adoption of each of these maxims, we should be led
back into an endless regress. Hence Kant notes
that the ultimate subjective ground of the adoption of moral maxims
is inscrutable is indeed already evident from this, that since this
adoption is free, its ground (why, for example, I have chosen an evil
and not a good maxim) must not be sought in any natural impulse,
but always again in a maxim. Now since this maxim also must have
its ground, and since apart from maxims no determining ground of
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free choice can or ought to be adduced, we are referred back endlessly in the series of subjective determining grounds, without ever being
able to reach the ultimate ground (R 17-18, note).
Reason, however, demands that we posit a kind of unconditioned condition in understanding the determination of our will. In other words, in
explaining our adoption of maxims to ourselves we must reach a point
where inquiry stops, and this point is a supreme or ultimate maxim which
accounts for how all other maxims might pose as incentives to the will.
Given that the adoption of this ultimate or supreme maxim is grounded in
freedom, and no further reasons can be adduced for its adoption (otherwise it would be conditioned, and not a supreme or ultimate maxim) its
adoption is inscrutable to us and constitutes the very mystery of freedom.
This ultimate or supreme maxim, equivalent to the most general rule
according to which an agent's more specific maxims are determined, conditions an agent's adoption of specific maxims, and constitutes an agent's
fundamental character or disposition. According to Kant, this fundamental disposition cannot be accounted for by "any original act of the will in
time" precisely because any such act occurring in time must be accounted
for by another maxim, one which explains how such a maxim was able to
pose as an incentive to the will. Kant's conclusion that this fundamental
disposition is not something acquired in time is one arrived at negatively:
given that any act occurring in time cannot be thought of as unconditioned
(since it belongs to the phenomenal realm, and as such must be thought to
belong to the series of cause and effect), the unconditioned condition of all
acts of the will in time cannot itself be thought of as occurring in time.
The disposition is, in essence, the fundamental choice that an individual
makes, having a determining influence on all other choices.' In the context
of the Religion, it is the fundamental choice one makes as to which incentive will be valued over others. According to Kant, the human being must
adopt both the moral incentive, and, since s/he is a sensuously conditioned
being, the incentive of self love into her maxim. Since both are adopted into
this maxim, either the satisfaction of one's self love will be made the condition of one's following the moral law, or action in accordance with the
moral law will be made the condition of satisfying one's empirically conditioned desires. The distinction between a good and evil individual "cannot
lie in the difference in the incentives which they adopt into their maxim
(not in the content of the maxim), but rather must depend upon subordination (the form of the maxim) i.e., which of the two incentives he makes the condition of the other. (R 31). The evil individual is evil in that he "reverses the
moral order of the incentives when he adopts them into his maxim," that
is, he "makes the incentive of self-love and its inclinations the condition of
obedience to the moral law ... "(R. 31-32). The choice of how these incentives are to stand in relation to one another constitutes the individual's fundamental disposition. This fundamental choice dictates the choices an
individual will make in given circumstances, that is, it determines what
will be valued in a particular situation and the agent's understanding of
the necessary course of action to achieve it. Hence the fundamental disposition acts as a kind of filter, or lens through which the values assigned to
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things or situations is already determined beforehand; for instance, the
individual that has chosen an evil disposition will value the fulfillment of
his desires (whatever they may be) precisely because they are his desires
over fulfillment of the moral law. This act of valuing, however, is such that
the individual often does not understand him/herself as actively engaged
in it, but rather, already finds desires connected with self love as more valuable than the incentive posed by the moral law. This is one way in which
the fundamental disposition can determine particular acts in time- it can
function as a kind of filter through which particular situations are assessed.
In order to come to a better understanding of Kant's resources for making
sense of character-the ground of a person's actions through time-we also
need to explore the relation of the disposition to the transcendental unity of
consciousness. While it might be objected that the latter belongs exclusively
to Kant's theoretical philosophy and does not have a place in the practical
sphere, reflection on the conditions necessary for rule governed behavior
will show that in order to relate desires to one another in order to rank
them-an operation indispensable to acting on principle-these desires
must be apprehended as the desires of one consciousness. Acting on principle presupposes that in order to achieve a desired goat means adequate to
the end in question will be adopted. But this also means that fleeting desires,
and perhaps other desires as well, must be deemed not worth acting on,
since to adopt the means necessary to achieve a desired end often means
foregoing the satisfaction of other desires. For instance, in order to achieve
the goal of health, other desires, such as the desire to eat as many sweets as
one pleases, must be ignored. To act on principle already presupposes that
the agent has some awareness of a variety of his or her desires and has
ranked them, foregoing those that are less important and that conflict with
his/her more significant goals. Hence the transcendental unity of consciousness must be presupposed if we are to make sense not only of the possibility
of rule governed behavior, but of the adoption of a fundamental disposition
as well, since in order for the two fundamental incentives to be compared
with one another and ranked, they must be the desires of one consciousness.
At this point it is instructive to ask: what kind of unity of the self does
the having of a disposition require? What are Kant's resources for making
sense of the unity of the self from a practical standpoint? This is important
since the notion of character generally implies the idea of a subject existing
through time; particular acts are grounded in the make-up of this subject.
One way of beginning to answer these questions is to compare Kant's
understanding of the practical unity of the self with Parfit's understanding
of the self. On Parfit's view-he calls it the reductionist view-personal
identity just consists in physical and psychological continuity. Parfit elaborates this reductionist view through the following two claims:
1)

the fact of a person's identity over time just consists of the holding of certain more particular facts

and
2)

these facts can be described without either presupposing the
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identity of the person, or explicitly claiming that the experiences in this person's life are had by this person, or even explicitly claiming that this person exists. s

On this view there is no subject of which thoughts and experiences are
determinations; no subject that might supply continuity to the self
throughout its changes. The view closely follows Hume's "bundle" theory, where the self is understood simply in terms of the various thoughts,
desires, and experiences that are the denizens of a person's psyche. As
Hume noted, when I introspect these objects of consciousness are all that I
encounter; I can never come across the subject that has these thoughts and
desires. 6 Given that no subject is to be found, psychological continuity
must be characterized in terms of causal relations between particular facts.
For instance, one thought may trigger another, or the satisfaction or frustration of a desire may lead to another. The only possible criteria of continuity between an individual at time t1 and that same individual at time t2
(20 years later) would be the number of facts of consciousness that have
remained the same, or the kinds of causal connections holding between the
series of the individual's thoughts and desires or states of consciousness.
On Parfit's view, for instance, what matters is what he calls relation R: psychological connectedness or unity with the right kind of cause. 7
On this view, there is no function of "transcendental unity" bringing
these thoughts, desires, and experiences into the unity of one consciousness
and hence into relation with one another. Now it is no doubt true that in his
first Critique Kant took over some of Hume's fundamental insights when he
argued against the possibility of theoretical knowledge of a substantial soul.
From the function of the transcendental unity of the self we are not warranted
in arguing to a substance that fulfills such a function. Nevertheless, Kant's
understanding of the self and of personal identity differed significantly from
Hume's theory precisely in that it did assume such a transcendental unity of
the self as a condition of the possibility of experience.
The groundwork for Kant's theory of the self is already laid in his subjective deduction in the first Critique. There we find that the transcendental
unity of apperception makes possible the unification of both synchronic
and diachronic elements, and that both are necessary if experience is to be
possible at all. Hence the synthesis of apprehension through which discrete impressions are run through and gathered together is intrinsically
tied to the synthesis of reproduction in which representations must be
actively reproduced from one moment to the next. In order to run through
and gather together discrete impressions I must be able to reproduce past
impressions that I have already run through so that I can associate them
with what is presently before my mind. Kant's famous example concerning
counting is to the point here:
For experience as such necessarily presupposes the reproducibility
of appearances. When I seek to draw a line in thought, or to think of
the time from one noon to another, or even to represent to myself
some particular number, obviously the various manifold representations that are involved must be apprehended by me in thought one
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after the other. But if I were always to drop out of thought the preceding representations (the first parts of the line, the antecedent parts
of the time period, or the units in the order represented), and did not
reproduce them while advancing to those that follow, a complete
representation would never be obtained: none of the above-mentioned thoughts, not even the purest and most elementary representations of space and time, could arise.
The synthesis of apprehension is thus inseparably bound up with
the synthesis of reproduction (KRV, A 102).
Furthermore I must be able to recognize these past impressions as my own;
there are analytic connections between the ability to synthesize the manifold and the thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness. As Kant notes,
In other words, only in so far as I can grasp the manifold of the representations in one consciousness, do Tcall them one and all mine. For
otherwise I should have as many-coloured and diverse a self as I
have representations of which I am conscious to myself. . .. This
principle of the necessary unity of apperception is itself, indeed, an
identical, and therefore analytic, proposition; nevertheless it reveals
the necessity of a synthesis of the manifold given in intuition, without
which the thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness cannot be
thought (KRV, B 134).
On Kant's view we cannot simply speak of the facts of consciousness as
if these facts could exist in isolation from one another and from the thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness itself. These facts must be relatable to one another, and if they are relatable to one another it can only be in
virtue of the identity of self-consciousness which first represents itself in
relation to one state of affairs (for instance as knowing or desiring x) and
then in relation to another. This cannot be stressed enough. For Kant the
very possibility of experience involves a transcendental unity of apperception that makes both synchronic and diachronic connections.
In this regard it may be objected that Kant himself admitted that the
identity of the consciousness of myself at different times does not prove the
numerical identity of my subject. States of consciousness, for instance,
might be passed on baton-like from one self to another. In such a case different substances exchange properties or determinations:
we can conceive a whole series of substances of which the first transmits its state together with its consciousness to the second, the second
its own state with that of the preceding substance to the third, and
this in turn the states of all the preceding substances together with its
own consciousness and with their consciousness to another. The last
substance would then be conscious of all the states of the previously
changed substances, as being its own states, because they would
have been transferred to it together with the consciousness of them.
And yet it would not have been one and the same person in all these
states (KRV, A 364).
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In such a scenario the self-same individual would be conscious of different
states connected with the past, but there would be no guarantee that that
very same individual was the one that actually had those states of consciousness at some point in the past. At most, what the formal unity of
consciousness allows us to infer is that "in the whole time in which I am
conscious of myself, I am conscious of this time as belonging to the unity of
myself" (KRV, A362). Hence Kant concludes that this simply amounts to
saying that this time is in me. It is, however, important to note that here
we do not simply have facts of consciousness, since the formal unity of consciousness holds them together, making it possible to set them in relation
to one another.
Moreover, it is important to take into account the context in which Kant
makes these remarks. The issue at stake in the third paralogism of transcendental psychology is how we can ascertain the numerical identity of
the self through experience. Tn order to do so we need to find "that permanent element in the appearance to which as subject everything else is related as determination" (KRV, A362). However, the transcendental unity of
consciousness can never be an object of experience, and as such can never
be identified with a permanent element in appearance. It is for this reason
that we cannot rule out the possibility of states of consciousness being
passed on baton-like from one self or subject to the next. Moreover, given
that the problem here is how we can ascertain the numerical identity of the
self through experience, whether there is a problem regarding personal identity depends upon one's standpoint. Given that from the first person point
of view-the standpoint of the agent-this whole time is in me, Kant concludes that "in my own consciousness .... identity of person is unfailingly
met with" CKRV, A362). Establishment of personal identity crops up as
problematic only from the standpoint of another person, that is, from a
third person point of view:
But if I view myself from the standpoint of another person (as object
of outer intuition), it is this outer observer who first represents me in
time, for in the apperception time is represented, strictly speaking,
only in me. Although he admits, therefore, the 'I' which accompanies,
and indeed with complete identity, all representations at all times in
my consciousness, he will draw no inference from this to the objective
permanence of myself (KRV, A362-363).
The problem of character and the care of the soul only arises, however,
from a practical standpoint, one which first and foremost presupposes a
first person transcendental point of view. Here then we not only have the
identity of a person "unfailingly met with," but we also must take into
account 1) the function of the transcendental self in relating a person's representations, experiences and desires to one another, as well as 2) the relation of this freely acting transcendental self to its actions in time. For it is
only in the context of a life, or at least of a long period of time, that it makes
sense to speak of a person's character, its development, and the relation of
this character to discrete actions.
An individual is not simply a bundle of disparate experiences, desires,
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representations, in short, of facts of consciousness. For these desires, experiences and representations are unified and relatable to one another insofar
as they are those of a single self. And this being a single self is something
more than Parfit's reductionist view of having a brain and a body. It rather
involves the transcendental activities of relating representations to one
another so as to make experience possible on the one hand and of the
structuring of desire so as to make action possible on the other. If a person's representations, experiences and desires are to influence one another
they must be the representations, experiences, and desires of a single transcendental consciousness.
Now while such a transcendental consciousness can never become an
object of experience, we are conscious of its activities and functions when
we think and act. The first person point of view involved in action
involves us in what Christine Korsgaard has dubbed the authorial point of
view." From this point of view we view actions and choices as essentially
our own rather than as things that simply happen to us. A person is not
simply a nexus of experiences and desires moved to act on whatever desire
happens to be the strongest one. The agent evaluates and gives structure
to his/her desires; she weighs their relative worth in light of her picture of
a life worth living. Even if the individual decides not to evaluate her
desires, but simply decides to act on her strongest desire, this is in itself an
evaluative choice- the choice to live the unexamined life and to be
swayed by the moment's desire. Henry Allison makes a similar point in
his defense of Kant's concept of transcendental freedom: an agent does not
act on desires simply because she has them, even when s/he acts heteronomously. In all cases, a desire must be incorporated into an agent's
maxim, which means that the simple having of a desire is not a sufficient
reason for acting upon it; an agent must also deem it a desire worth acting
upon. This act of incorporating a desire into one's maxim cannot be
thought of as itself the effect of some other, higher order desire detennined
in us by causes lying outside the will. Rather it must originate with the
will itself, and this means that it must be an act of transcendental freedom."
As argued above, once freedom is assumed, when we seek to understand
why a given maxim was acted upon, the answer can only lie in some other
higher order maxim that was itself freely adopted. The highest order
maxim is the disposition, which grounds all lower level maxims adopted
in time. It is through the disposition that we can relate a maxim made at
time b with a maxim made at time 12; moreover, through the disposition we
can understand continuities in a person's character. Now the adoption of a
disposition is an act of the free transcendental consciousness, and so is likewise the act of evaluating, ranking and ordering desires in relation to one
another in light of the fundamental disposition.
If the notion of character is to make sense, we cannot speak of a bundle
of desires and experiences loosely related to one another. They must be
related to one another in virtue of one consciousness that is able to survey
these experiences and desires together, to evaluate them and to rank them.
Similarly, if we are to speak about character we must also be able to understand how actions done at two different periods of time are related to one
another. The question of personal identity through time thus becomes an
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issue crucial to the problem of moral development and character formation. If I cannot assume that some kind of identity holds between myself
today and myself five years from now, but rather I must consider the time
throughout which I exist as containing a series of selves loosely related to
one another, the whole notion of goal oriented action looses its coherence.
Similarly the whole idea of progress in virtue and of the care of the soul
presupposes that the person I am now is one and the same as the person
who I will be five years from now. If I am to progress in virtue, 1 must be
able to undergo change as I effect change in myself; if there is no T that
undergoes change but simply a loose collection of selves related to one
another in terms of causal relations and degrees of similarities, it is not
clear why I should be concerned about the state of these future selves.
Kant's solution to the problem is that from a first person transcendental
point of view time is in me, that is, "in the whole time in which I am conscious of myself, I am conscious of this time as belonging to the unity of
myself" (KRV, A362). In fact, as a form of inner sense time is generated
by my act of attending first to one representation and then to another.
From a practical perspective this means that insofar as J project myself
into the future, I am conscious of these future experiences as my own and
hence of the time in which they occur as belonging to the unity of my consciousness. Moreover, our present projects take time and require us to
project ourselves into the future, i.e., we do now what it is that will be necessary to achieve a desired result later. This means that from a practical
standpoint I must identify with my future self if my present actions are to
have any meaning; as Korsgaard puts it, "to the extent that you regulate
your choices by identifying yourself as the one who is implementing
something like a particular plan of life, you need to identify with your
future in order to be what you are even now."") All of this is important, in
that it shows that Parfit's attempt to derive ethical consequences concerning how we should regard our future selves (as not strictly identical with
our present self) is mistaken.
Contra Parfit, two things have been shown. First, that the self is not
simply a bundle of facts of consciousness since experi.ence is only possible
if we assume the transcendental unity of consciousness. Second, that from
a first person practical point of view I can and must assume personal identity throughout time; from a practical standpoint, it is impossible not to
identify with my future self.
ll. Transformation, Personal Identity, and the Dc'ue/opment of Virtue
If Kant is to have a viable account of how it is possible for an individual
to cultivate virtue, he needs to have the following elements in place. First,
he needs to show how we can understand the identity of an individual
through time. Second, he needs to provide us with an account of how it is
that actions flow from a person's character, that is, how it is possible that
the state of the individual before initiating an action is connected with the
initiation of that act itself. If this link were not established, we could not
connect a person's intentions and desires (elements of a person's character)
with what that person actually does at a given moment. These two issues
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have been discussed above. Third, he needs to provide us with some
account of what exactly it means for an individual to grow in virtue.
At this point it is be instructive to compare Kant's understanding of
virtue with that of Aristotle. For Aristotle, to acquire virhle is a matter of
habituating the self to act virtuously until virtue becomes a matter of second nature. Hence, one begins with concrete actions, and these actions
eventually have an effect on character; it is as if acting in a certain way
etches certain pathways in the psyche and informs it. Particular actions
thus become constitutive of character. For Kant, on the other hand, an
action only has moral significance insofar as it can be understood as action
in accordance with a rule. Furthermore, an action has moral worth only if
it is done for the sake of duty; it is not enough for it to be merely in accordance with duty. Hence to believe that given actions, regardless of their
motivation, can become habitual and can thus serve to build up a person's
moral character is mistaken. To believe that one can go about reforming
the fundamental ground of the will through singular actions is a confusion
of cause and effect. Particular actions, being the fruit of a will that is itself
either good or evil, are always merely its concrete expressions, and it is a
misunderstanding to believe that by merely changing particular actions, the
fundamental maxim of the will itself will be changed. I I
For Kant, then, it seems that the only way we can connect an action at
time b with an action at time b is through the disposition. The two actions
are not directly related to one another. Rather, they are related to each
other only in virtue of some third thing to which each is related, namely
the disposition itself. Hence it seems that insofar as given actions are merely the concrete expressions of the fundamental disposition, there is no way
that a particular action in time can influence the seat of character. Given
such an account, it becomes very difficult to understand the possibility of
the phenomenal development of virtue where concrete actions serve to
constitute a person's character; instead, it seems that all actions are simply
the expressions of a fundamental disposition, itself timelessly chosen.1 2
Allen Wood notes that
timeless agency ... makes nonsense of the goal of moral improvement
or moral progress. . .. On Kant's theory, only our external actions
occur in time; our freedom, to which alone true moral worthiness or
unworthiness pertains, is timeless, and hence incapable of changing
for better or worse. . .. there is no place in Kant's theory for the idea
that I may resist some passion or inclination of mine tomorrow by
struggling with it today, and by striving throughout the day to purify
my motives and fortify myself for the crucial hour of decision. 11
Kant's view seems completely opposed to the Aristotelian one, where particular actions are understood to have an effect on the seat of moral character.
However, the picture that Kant offers us in the Religion is much more
complicated than this. Key to understanding his account of progress in
virtue is his characterization of the propensity to evil. Such a propensity is
the effect, and not the ground, of our having adopted a fundamentally evil
maxim. I. The adoption of such a fundamentally evil maxim, in which the

490

Faith and Philosophy

satisfaction of the lower faculty of desire is made the condition of obedience to the moral law (R 32), has effects that far outlast the time during
which such a maxim is operative. Even after the individual, "reverses, by a
single unchangeable decision, that highest ground of his maxims whereby
he was an evil man (and thus puts on the new man)" (R43) slhe will have
to deal with the propensity to evil. Hence the person can be considered
good "only in continuous labor and growth" (R 43).
Kant defines a propensity as a 'predisposition to crave a delight which,
when once experienced, arouses in the subject an inclination to it' (R 25).
Hence a propensity is linked with the frailty of our human nature, which is
partly rational, partly animal. Once an evil disposition has been operative
in our lives, it adversely affects the structure of our desiring even after we
have resolved to become better persons. The propensity to evil functions much
in the same way as an addiction: one can, through a free act, incapacitate
the freedom of the will through the affection of one's sensibilities; henceforth one craves a particular substance. Analogously, once the incentive of
self-love has been valued over the moral law, there will be a predisposition
to want to put oneself and one's subjective interests above duty.
The dynamic of how a propensity to evil can coexist with a fundamentally good disposition can be clarified through a distinction between first
and second order desires. First order desires are those desires I simply
happen to have; they are immediately given. Second order desires concern
the person I would like to be, and hence have to do with the kinds of
desires I would like to have. 's For instance, I may want to be the kind of
person that does not feel envy or jealousy (a second order desire), yet may
still find myself coveting my neighbor's good fortune. The fact that I really
do want to be the kind of person that takes joy in another's good fortune
would reflect my having adopted a fundamentally good maxim; this however, could in principle coexist with negative feelings and desires with
which I would rather not identify, but which I nonetheless find myself having. The clearest example of the coexistence of the propensity to evil with a
fundamentally good disposition can be found in Kant's discussion of the
first degree of radical evil:
... the frailty of human nature is expressed even in the complaint of
the Apostle, "What I would, that I do not!" In other words, I adopt
the good (the law) into the maxim of my will, but this good, which
objectively, in its ideal conception (in thesi), is an irresistible incentive,
is subjectively (in hypothesi, ) when the maxim is to be followed, the
weaker (in comparison with inclination) (R 25).
In the case of the first degree of radical evil, not only is the individual torn
by a discrepancy between her first and second order desires, she also finds
that the desires she simply finds herself having, and with which she would
rather not identify, (her first order desires) frequently overpower her.
These first order desires are the left over effects of once having adopted a
fundamentally evil maxim.
That a basically good individual can be incapacitated through the
propensity to evil is a fact crucial to understanding how progress in virtue
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is possible over time. The fact that an individual can make progress in
virtue already presupposes that s/he is committed to a good course of life
without, however, already having achieved perfection. One way of explicating this would be to say that the individual's first order desires were not
in line with her second order desires. Progress in virhle would thus consist
in bringing first order desires in line with second order desires. This
would imply, however, that our first order desires can be strengthened or
weakened, that they can be affected and brought into line with our second
order desires. Insofar as this is true, particular actions can have an affect on
the desires that we simply find ourselves having, i.e., on desires that are
often associated with the lower faculty of desire and hence with our rcceptivity.'6 For instance, whether or not I chose to start to smoke today will
have an affect on the sorts of desires I will have tomorrow; the desires I
have tomorrow will in part depend on what it is I chose to invest my energies in today. Hence temporal actions are not simply the expressions of a
timelessly chosen disposition. Which first-order desires I have and act on
today will depend upon what 1 did yesterday and the kind of projects I
invested myself in. This means that I can affect myself (in accordance with
my second order desires) so as to channel and direct my first order desires.
Numerous passages show that Kant was well aware of this. For
instance, in the Anthropology Kant notes that "Sensitivity is a power and
strength by which we grant or refuse permission for the state of pleasure or
displeasure to enter our mind, so that it implies a choice."]7 Insofar as one's
desires are often connected with one's emotional state, the affection of
one's emotions will also have an effect on one's desires. And in his Lectures
an Ethics Kant claims, "The command to love our neighbor applies within
limits both to love from obligation [practicallovel and love from inclination [pathologicallovel. For if 1 love others from inclination, I acquire in
the course of time a taste for it, and my love, originally duty born, becomes
an inclination."'s
This bringing of my first order desires into line with my (moral) second
order desires constitutes growth in virtue. This analysis comes closer to
the Aristotelian picture where virtues are acquired habits, although there
are of course significant differences between Kant and Aristotle. In both
the Kantian and Aristotelian pictures desires can be channeled through
concrete temporal actions. For Kant, however, in order for this to count as
growth in moral virhle, the channeling of my first order desires must be the
result of conscious self-affection in accordance with moral second order
desires; growth in virtue cannot simply be a question of habituation.
While Kant acknowledges the possibility of growth in virtue, he insists
that "if a man is to become not merely legally, but morally, a good man ...,
this cannot be brought about through gradual reformation so long as the
basis of the maxims remains impure, but must be effected through a revolution in the man's disposition" (R. 43). Growth in virtue is indeed possible,
but it is something that occurs only after the revolution in the disposition
has occurred.
Kant's account of personal identity encounters its severest difficulties in
regard to the problems associated with a revolution in the disposition. If
the disposition functions as the underlying unifying ground of rule gov-
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erned behavior, how are we to account for the change from one disposition
to the other? If all that unifies maxim-making is the disposition, does it not
then seem as if there is no connection between the individual before and
after conversion when s/he, through a fundamental decision, alters his or
her disposition? Is there any way that we can understand personal identity throughout this change? It is significant that in his discussion Kant
adopts the Pauline image of the "death of the old man" and the "birth of
the new."l9 Moreover, he continually notes that the individual that has
exchanged an evil disposition for a good one is "morally another person."20
Given that the disposition is the only viable candidate available to explain
how we are to connect an agent's actions at two different times with one
another, there is much to be said for this kind of language. After all, as
noted above, it is illegitimate to think of the individual as a kind of substance in which thoughts and character traits inhere and which endures
throughout changes in jts thoughts and objects of experiences.
If an individual cannot be this kind of substantial entity, then neither
can a character. At best we can understand a character as a set of concerns,
projects and desires had by an individual." Some of these concerns, projects, and desires are "nested" in projects and concerns of a higher order;
for instance, one often undertakes projects for the sake of others. At the
root will be a fundamental concern in terms of which other desires and
projects can be understood. Hence a crucial component of character is just
such a nexus of desires that stand in a hierarchical relation to one another:
for example, the fulfillment of particular desire may be important only
because of its relation to other, more fundamental desires that an agent has
deemed worth pursuing. The disposition functions much in the same way
as this root concern; once it is changed other desires must follow suit if the
individual is not to be a divided self. Full integration of the personality
takes time, since the person is often not aware that her desires in fact conflict with one another; experience is necessary for an individual to discover
the real nature and significance of many of the things that s/he desires and
how these may be incompatible with his or her fundamental life project
(for the good individual this would amount to a valuing of action for the
sake of the moral law above all else). This is another way of understanding
how the having of an evil disposition leaves a "residue" even after it has
been exchanged for a good one; one often continues to value elements
expressive of the old self's fundamental project without understanding
how they are connected with it. For example, an individual may have
undergone a genuine moral conversion while still having commitments
(for instance making a great deal of money) that might conflict with the
demands of social justice. It is often not clear to an individual how moral
conversion has implications for all of a person's commitments: personal,
social, and political. A person that has undergone such a conversion will
no doubt be open to growth in understanding and a broadening of his or
her horizons in all of these areas. This broadening, however, often takes
time and education.
Once the disposition, or root concern has been changed, there is a fundamental sense in which the individual is a different person. How a
change in disposition is possible is a mystery; it is connected with the prob-
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lem of the transcendentally free self that chooses. Kant himself notes that
" ... since the lapse from good into evil (when one remembers that this
originates in freedom) is no more comprehensible than the re-ascent from
evil to good, the possibility of this last cannot be impunged" (R 40). As
noted above, the transcendental self does the work of relating a person's
thoughts, desires, and experiences to one another. Because it is never an
object of experience, very little else can be said about it aside from the way
it functions. Why it would choose to make the self its fundamental project
as opposed to action in accordance with the moral law (radical evil), or
how it is possible that it should change from evil to good remains shrouded in mystery. Given the fact that little can be said about the transcendentally free self, there seem to be very few resources available to Kant to provide an account of personal identity throughout this change.
There are, however, a few things that Kant can say regarding the problem. First, while there is no explanation for the descent into evil, there is an
important sense in which it is only when the self acts in accordance with the
moral incentive that it is at one with itself. To choose the incentive of self
love over the moral incentive (which can never be eradicated) means, for
Kant, to act on desires one simply happens to have and hence to allow one's
will to be directed by causes lying outside of it. 22 The individual that chooses to act on whatever desire s/he happens to have regardless of the directives of the moral law acts from the incentive of self-love. One's empirically
given desires (the desires one happens to have) however, are caused. Since
every cause is also an effect, these causes can eventually be traced to causes
lying outside the self. To prioritize the incentive of self-love over that of the
moral law is thus, ironically, to identify with something that is not really
oneself. Regardless of the descent into evil, the true identity of the self lies
with Wille, the ability of the will to be a law unto itself. This ability is never
lost by the person; as Kant notes the ground of radical evil cannot "be
placed in the corruption of the morally legislative reason-as if reason
could destroy the authority of the very law which is its own, or deny the
obligation arising therefrom; this is absolutely impossible" (R 30).23
Second, we have already discussed the phenomenon of radical evil-the
volitional residue left over even after one has exchanged an evil maxim for
a good one. That past desires can affect future ones in this way is evidence
for the unity of the self through time. Because it is the same self that once
chose an evil maxim that now chooses a good one, the effects of that past
choice must be undone. The nexus of a person's desires are related to one
another by the rational agent. Because they are so related, choosing to act
on a given desire often affects one's other desires. Moreover, the adoption
of an evil fundamental maxim affects the very structuring of desire and
hence the whole way that an individual values and understands the world.
Undoing these effects takes time and growth in virtue. Hence in a remarkable passage worth citing at length Kant asks whether the person who has
entered into goodness should count the evils that occur to her in this life as
punishment:
Yes, but only in the quality of the man whom he is continually
putting off. Everything (and this comprises all the miseries and ills of
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life in general) that would be due him as punishment in that quality
(of the old man) he gladly takes upon himself in his quality of new
man simply for the sake of the good. So far as he is a new man, consequently, these sufferings are not ascribed to him as plmishment at
all. The use of the term "punishment" signifies merely that, in his
quality of new man, he now willingly takes upon himself, as so many
opportunities for the testing and exercising of his disposition to
goodness, all the ills and miseries that assail him, which the old man
would have had to regard as punishments and which he too, so far as
he is still in the process of becoming dead to the old man, accepts as
such. This punishment, indeed, is simultaneously the effect and also
the cause of such moral activity and consequently of that contentment and moral happiness which consists of a consciousness of
progress in goodness (and this is one and the same act as forsaking
evil). While possessed of the old disposition, on the other hand, he
would not only have had to count the very same ills as punishments
but he would also have had to feel them as such, since, even though
they are regarded as mere ills, they are the direct opposite of what, in
the form of physical happiness, an individual in this state of mind
makes his sole objective (R 69).
Becoming dead to the old man is a process and not something that happens
at once. It includes the thwarting of many of the desires that are merely
empirically given and so connected with self-love and with the body. It is
often through ills thwarting these desires that moral learning takes place
and that the self is purified of the vestiges of desire connected with the old
self.24
It is important to note that when we speak of moral learning and of
progress in virtue we speak of one self that undergoes a change. This is the
self that evaluates, ranks, and connects desires to one another and that
slowly comes to understand the meaning of the having of a good disposition for all of the self's projects. Through such progress the person
achieves a fully rounded character having all the desires and projects
appropriate to an individual with a good disposition.
The fact that one's having chosen a bad disposition in the past still has
an effect on the present (even after one has reversed the fundamental disposition) is once more evidence for the unity of the self through time. No
doubt the skeptic can still object that it is possible that all one's desires are
passed baton-like from one temporal part of the self to the next, without
there being a single unifying principle relating all of these desires and
hence all of these temporal parts to one another. However, such a hypothesis does not do as good a job of explaining how it is possible that present
projects and desires can be related to one another (and to future ones) as
the notion that these projects and desires are related to one another
through the transcendental activity of practical rationality. One's past
choices have an effect on one's future desires because both are related to
one another through the transcendental activity of consciousness. A past
evil disposition can have effects spilling over into the present even when
the fundamental maxim has been changed because complete integration of
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the personality-the achievement of coherence among one's desires-is a
process that takes time.
For Kant the self that chooses to act heteronomously is always a divided
self. It is divided because the moral incentive can never be expunged and
even the most wicked of persons feels its tug. Moreover, as noted above, to
prioritize incentives that are merely given (and thus caused by factors lying
outside the will itself) is to value, and hence to identify with something that
is not really oneself. Full integration of the personality can thereby only
occur when a good disposition has been chosen and the individualleams to
bring all of her desires in line with the demands of morality. This integration is the goal of the cultivation of character and the care of the souJ.2"
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